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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKee, Circuit Judge 
 
Willie Lee Tyler ("Tyler") appeals his convictions on 
charges arising out of the killing of Doreen Proctor, a 
government witness who was scheduled to testify against 
Tyler's brother, David, the day after Proctor's murder. Tyler, 
David, Roberta Ronique Bell and others were subsequently 
arrested and charged in state court. Tyler and Bell were 
acquitted of murder in the state prosecution (though they 
were convicted of conspiracy to intimidate a witness) and 
were thereafter separately prosecuted for witness tampering 
and related offenses in federal court. Tyler was convicted of 
conspiracy, witness tampering, and a related firearms 
offense in the federal prosecution, and this appeal followed. 
He raises several assertions of error, however, we only 
discuss his assertion that the district court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress certain custodial 
statements. His remaining assertions are either meritless or 
waived with the exception of his challenge to the court's 
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. S 1512. We will mention that 
assertion only briefly as we have already disposed of that 
claim in the appeal taken by one of Tyler's companions. For 
the reasons that follow, we will reverse the district court's 
order denying suppression of the statement Tyler gave after 
 
                                2 
  
being given his Miranda warnings, and remand for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.1  
 
I. 
 
In April 1992, David Tyler was to be tried in the Court of 
Common Pleas in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania on 
criminal charges related to drug trafficking. Doreen Proctor, 
a government informant for the Tri-County Drug Task Force 
in Central Pennsylvania, was scheduled to testify against 
him. Ms. Proctor had previously testified against several 
individuals, including David Tyler, during a preliminary 
hearing in state court in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. However, 
the day before David Tyler's trial was to begin, David Tyler 
and his cohorts severely beat, stabbed, and shot Proctor. 
Her mangled body was discovered the next day. 
 
On July 9, 1992, police arrested Willie Tyler for the 
murder of Proctor and took him to the Carlisle Borough 
Police Department. After an officer gave Tyler his Miranda 
warnings,2 Tyler stated that he did not wish to make a 
statement, and the officers refrained from further 
interrogation. 
 
Tyler was then taken to the State Police Barracks in 
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania for re-arraignment.3 Detective 
Ronald Egolf of the Carlisle Police Department was assigned 
to guard and process him. Upon arriving at the barracks, 
Tyler was taken to a small room and, at about 10:00 pm, 
he and Detective Egolf engaged in a discussion that 
included hunting, Tyler's education, and Tyler's mother's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 1291. 
 
2. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
3. There is some dispute about exactly what occurred in transit. Tyler 
alleges that police drove through a parking lot where Tyler and his co- 
conspirators had driven the night of Proctor's murder. However, the 
government disputes this testimony, and the district court did not 
attempt to resolve the conflict. In any event, given our holding today, 
the 
significance of this conflict is greatly reduced. We note, however, as 
suggested by our discussion below, that the district court must resolve 
this conflict on remand to the extent that it may be relevant to the 
circumstances leading up to the defendant's statement of July 20. 
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health. Although it is clear that the police and Tyler were 
engaged in a discussion up until 10:55 pm, it is not clear 
how many police were involved, nor exactly what was said. 
It is clear, however, that at approximately 10:55 pm, Tyler 
began to cry, and the police again warned him of his 
Miranda rights. This time Tyler gave an inculpatory 
statement that was introduced against him at his trial. 
 
Eleven days later, on July 20, police obtained another 
statement from Tyler while he was in custody in Adams 
County Jail. The government maintains that the officers 
repeated Miranda warnings, that Tyler verbally 
acknowledged that he understood them, and that he 
proceeded to orally waive those rights and give another 
inculpatory statement. That statement, which was also 
introduced against him at trial, differs from the July 9 
statement in that in the later statement Tyler states that 
David wanted only to "scare" Ms. Proctor. Def. Exh. "J". In 
his earlier statement, Tyler had said that David wanted to 
kill her. 
 
Tyler filed a motion to suppress all statements made on 
July 9, and the statement he made on July 20. The district 
court granted Tyler's suppression motion as to any 
statement Tyler may have given on July 9 before receiving 
Miranda warnings ("the 10:00 pm statement"),4 but denied 
it both as to the statement he gave after he was warned 
("the 10:55 pm statement"), and the statement he later gave 
on July 20 in the Adams County jail. Tyler now argues that 
the district court should have suppressed both the 10:55 
pm statement and the July 20 statement. Although we 
agree that the district court erred in denying the 
suppression motion as to the 10:55 statement, we cannot, 
on the basis of this record, make a determination as to the 
July 20 statement. Accordingly, we will remand to allow the 
district court to make an appropriate inquiry into the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The parties and the district court refer to the dates of the prior 
statement(s) alternatively as July 9, 1992, July 10 and July 9-10 
because of the lateness of the hour. For the sake of consistency, and 
clarity, we will assume that the date of any statement given during the 
custodial interrogation that began at 10:00 pm was July 9, 1992, even 
though the statement may have been given after midnight. 
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admissibility of that statement. If the court concludes that 
the July 20 statement was properly admitted, it must then 
determine whether or not the error of admitting the July 9 
statement was harmless. 
 
II. 
 
Before addressing the substance of Tyler's challenge to 
the district court's rulings on the suppression motion, we 
first note that Tyler also argues that there was insufficient 
evidence to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. 
S 1512(a)(1)(A) and (C) (tampering with a federal witness, or 
interfering with a federal investigation). We need not 
discuss that contention, however, because we recently 
rejected the identical contention of codefendant, Roberta 
Ronique Bell, in her appeal from her conviction based upon 
her involvement in the murder of Ms. Proctor. See United 
States v. Bell, 113 F.3d 1345, 1348-51 (3d Cir. 1997). We 
reject Tyler's argument that the evidence did not establish 
federal jurisdiction under that statute for the same reasons 
that we rejected the identical arguments of Ms. Bell. 
 
III. 
 
A. The 10:55 pm Statement 
 
Tyler maintains that the district court erred when it 
admitted the 10:55 pm statement that was taken on July 9, 
after he had exercised his right to remain silent. We 
exercise plenary review as to the admissibility of each of the 
challenged statements. United States v. Benton, 996 F.2d 
642, 644 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Calisto, 838 
F.2d 711, 717-18 (3d Cir. 1988)). 
 
There is no dispute that Tyler was in custody when he 
gave both the 10:55 pm statement and the July 20 
statement. 
 
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court held that 
 
       [W]hen an individual is taken into custody or otherwise 
       deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any 
       significant way and is subjected to questioning, the 
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       privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. 
       Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the 
       privilege and unless other fully effective means are 
       adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and 
       to assure that the exercise of the right will be 
       scrupulously honored, [certain warnings] are required 
       . . . . But unless and until such warnings and waiver 
       are demonstrated by the prosecution . . . no evidence 
       obtained as a result of interrogation can be used 
       against him. 
 
384 U.S. at 478-79 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court 
elaborated upon this in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 
(1975). There, the Court succinctly stated: "We .. . 
conclude that the admissibility of statements obtained after 
the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends 
under Miranda on whether his right to cut off questioning 
was scrupulously honored." 384 U.S. at 104 (emphasis in 
the original text). 
 
When Tyler was taken to the police barracks after 
asserting his right to remain silent, he was placed in a 
small room, the walls of which contained a timeline of the 
murder investigation and crime scene photographs, 
including two photographs of the body of Doreen Proctor 
(one of which was in color). He remained there for hours. In 
his report, Trooper Graham stated that he, Detective 
Ronald Egolf and Troopers Donnelly and Fenstermacher 
began "talking to" Tyler at about 10:00 pm, even though 
Tyler had previously told them that he did not want to 
make a statement. Graham also stated in his report: 
 
       While talking to Tyler he became very emotional and 
       began to cry. Mr. Tyler stated he did not know they 
       were going to kill Doreen Proctor and that he was there 
       when it happened but did not see if Roberta Ronique 
       Bell or Jerome Kenneth King did the shooting. He did 
       however relate that those two subjects were the only 
       people back there when it happened and that his 
       brother David James Tyler had remained in the first 
       vehicle with him. David James Tyler was [leaning] out 
       of the car, crying and yelling, "We got to kill her now," 
       "We got to kill her now." 
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       At this time Mr. Tyler was stopped and again advised 
       [of] his Miranda warnings by Trpr. Fenstermacher and 
       Mr. Tyler signed the Rights Waiver form which is 
       attached to this report . . . . 
 
D.Ct. Op. at 7. According to Graham, it was at that 
moment that Tyler revealed all that happened the night of 
the murder and the identity of those involved. 
 
Detective Egolf's testimony at the suppression hearing 
sharply conflicted with Trooper Graham's account of the 
evening. Egolf claimed that he and Tyler were the only two 
people present in the room when Tyler started to cry, and 
that he told Tyler to "tell the truth" when he began crying. 
App. at 287. Egolf also claimed that Tyler then began to 
speak and, at 10:55 pm, he (Egolf) read Tyler his rights. 
 
The conflicting nature of the police testimony in this case 
caused the district court to comment: "We are troubled by 
the glaring inconsistencies between Trooper Graham's 
report and the testimony elicited at the suppression hearing 
concerning what occurred prior to 10:55 pm on July 9, 
1992." D.Ct. Op. at 7. The court also noted that "[a]t this 
point,5 the facts become unclear, particularly with respect 
to Trooper Graham." D. Ct. Op. at 6. However, the district 
court failed to make any findings of fact as to what actually 
happened. We note, however, that Egolf and Graham's 
versions of what occurred are both inconsistent with their 
obligation to scrupulously honor Tyler's assertion of his 
right to remain silent. Nevertheless, the district court's 
failure to make findings of fact has made our task of 
reviewing this record and ruling upon Tyler's arguments 
significantly more difficult. It is clear that the district court 
was troubled by the testimony the police gave in this case, 
and the court suggests that the testimony is not credible. 
For example, the court responded to the government's 
argument that Tyler never asserted his right to remain 
silent as follows: 
 
       [T]hat argument, and the testimony of the 
       Government's witnesses at the [suppression] hearing 
       are undermined by the prior testimony of Trooper Craig 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Here, the court is referring to the moment when Tyler began to cry. 
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       R. Fenstermacher, who testified that Defendant "was 
       asked if he wanted to give us any statements or 
       information and he declined, so no further questions 
       were posed to him." 
 
D. Ct. Op. at 6. Rather than make findings of fact and 
conduct an analysis based upon those findings, the district 
court allowed any statement into evidence that was 
obtained after Tyler was advised of his Miranda rights. The 
court stated: 
 
       To the extent that the Defendant did make any 
       statements while being interviewed between 10:00 and 
       10:55, those statements will be suppressed.6 However, 
       any statements made after Defendant knowingly signed 
       a waiver of his rights are admissible. Defendant's"fruit 
       of the poisonous tree" argument must be rejected. Even 
       assuming the officers improperly elicited statements 
       from the Defendant prior to reading him his rights, the 
       statements that Defendant made after 10:55 p.m. were 
       the result of Defendant's knowing and voluntary waiver 
       of his rights and were not tainted by any prior illegal 
       statements. 
 
D. Ct. Op. at 8. The appropriate inquiry under Miranda and 
its progeny, however, is not simply whether Tyler knowingly 
waived his rights after receiving appropriate warnings. 
Rather, the inquiry is whether the police "scrupulously 
honored" Tyler's assertion of his right to remain silent. 
Here, it is clear that they did not. 
 
In Mosley, the Supreme Court amplified its 
pronouncement that "[i]f the individual indicates in any 
manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he 
wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease." 
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74. The Court in Mosley 
explained that this language could be interpreted literally to 
mean several things: that a person who has invoked his or 
her right to silence can never be subjected to custodial 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. It does not appear from the record that Tyler made a statement before 
10:55 pm. The district court did not specificallyfind that he did, it 
merely ruled that any statement that Tyler may have made before that 
time was suppressed. 
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interrogation; that any statement that was taken following 
exercise of the privilege is "the product of compulsion and 
would therefore mandate its exclusion from evidence, even 
if volunteered . . . without any further interrogation 
whatever"; or that it may "require only the immediate 
cessation of questioning, and . . . permit a resumption of 
interrogation after a momentary respite." 423 U.S. at 102. 
However, the Court rejected each of these interpretations. 
In rejecting the latter interpretation, the Court reasoned 
that allowing interrogation "after only a momentary 
cessation would clearly frustrate the purposes of Miranda 
by allowing repeated rounds of questioning to undermine 
the will of the person being questioned." Id. 
 
Accordingly, it is clear that police can not, as if by 
alchemy, negate Tyler's invocation of his right to remain 
silent by a mantra-like recitation of Miranda warnings. The 
warnings are not intended to be a mere ritual, the exercise 
of which guarantees the admissibility of any statement that 
is obtained in a custodial interrogation regardless of the 
circumstances. "The critical safeguard identified in 
[Miranda] is a person's right to cut off questioning." Mosley, 
423 U.S. at 104 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, 
as earlier noted, the Court concluded in Mosley "that the 
admissibility of statements obtained after the person in 
custody has decided to remain silent depends under 
Miranda on whether his right to cut off questioning was 
scrupulously honored." Id. (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Therefore, the district court erred when it simply 
concluded that "any statements made after Defendant 
knowingly signed a waiver of his rights are admissible." D. 
Ct. Op. at 8. Here, the command to "tell the truth" after 
Tyler had invoked his Miranda rights is the antithesis of 
scrupulously honoring his right to remain silent. Detective 
Egolf (and possibly others), see supra at pp. 2 and 6, had 
been carrying on a conversation with Tyler for nearly an 
hour when he broke down and was instructed to "tell the 
truth." These circumstances would, in and of themselves, 
be inconsistent with scrupulously honoring Tyler's 
assertion of silence. However, to make matters worse (as 
noted above), the room in which the "conversation" 
occurred had pictures of the murder victim hung on the 
walls. 
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Thus, the district court clearly erred in allowing the 
prosecution to admit statements taken from defendant after 
10:55 pm on July 9. The prosecution should not have been 
allowed to admit those statements in its case-in-chief.7 
 
B. The July 20, 1992 Statement 
 
This case raises an issue that we have not yet addressed 
in the context in which Tyler raises it. We have previously 
had to determine the legality of a custodial statement after 
police have illegally obtained a prior statement in the 
context of a technical violation of Miranda under the Fifth 
Amendment. See United States v. Johnson, 816 F.2d 918 
(3d Cir. 1987). We have not, however, determined the 
proper analysis when the prior illegality that is alleged to 
taint a subsequent "Mirandized" statement is the failure of 
the police to scrupulously honor a defendant's right to cut 
off questioning. Tyler claims that the July 20 statement 
should have been suppressed because it was obtained in 
violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and was 
"the product of the initial illegalities that occurred on July 
9th and 10th." Appellant's Br. at 44 (citing Wong Sun v. 
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)). The government 
counters that Tyler's right to counsel was not violated 
because Tyler initiated the questioning. We believe the 
analysis that has been used to resolve allegations that 
statements were tainted by a prior violation of the Fourth 
and/or Fifth Amendment should also guide, though not 
control, our inquiry into the failure to scrupulously honor 
Tyler's right to remain silent, and the purported denial of 
his right to counsel.8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. Since we hold that the district court erred in admitting the 10:55 
statement, we need not address Tyler's argument that the tactics used 
by police amounted to a ploy to overcome his will that was the functional 
equivalent of interrogation in violation of the rule enunciated in Rhode 
Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). 
 
8. In his concurring opinion, Judge Alito states that "Tyler's brief did 
not 
seek suppression of the July 9 statement on constitutional grounds." See 
Dissent at 24. However, Tyler states that the state troopers failed to 
"scrupulously honor" his right to remain silent under Michigan v. Mosley. 
See Appellant's Br. at 40. He also argues that police engaged in a 
"continuing barrage of psychological ploys" to elicit statements after 
10:55 p.m. on July 9, Appellant's Br. at 39. Therefore, he asserts a 
constitutional violation under Mosley. 
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When determining whether a suspect's Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel has been violated, our standard of review 
is plenary. Flamer v. Delaware, 68 F.3d 710, 720 (3d Cir. 
1995). The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches"at 
or after the time that judicial proceedings have been 
initiated against [an individual] whether by way of formal 
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or 
arraignment." Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 
(1977). 
 
Here, Troopers Fenstermacher and Graham visited Tyler 
in his cell at Adams County Jail on July 20, 1992 and 
obtained an inculpatory statement from him. Tyler had 
already been arraigned and his right to counsel had  
attached.9 
 
Trooper Fenstermacher testified that Tyler initiated the 
meeting. App. at 298, 321-22. He stated that a guard, or 
someone in a similar capacity, told him and Graham that 
Tyler desired to make a statement.10 According to 
Fenstermacher, Graham re-Mirandized Tyler, but did not 
ask Tyler to sign a waiver of his Miranda rights. Graham 
testified that Tyler was aware of his rights and chose not to 
invoke them. The district court agreed. 
 
We will analyze the legality of the July 20 statement both 
under the theory that the statement was the illegal fruit of 
the prior failure to honor Tyler's request that questioning 
cease and in terms of the purported waiver of Tyler's right 
to counsel. These two avenues of attack are similar, but not 
identical. They do, however, converge into a single inquiry 
-- the validity of the purported waiver on July 20. 
 
1. Waiver 
 
In denying Tyler's challenge to statements taken on July 
20, the district court observed: "[T]here is nothing in the 
record to support an argument that Defendant's waiver was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Counsel, however, was not appointed for Tyler until July 21, 1993. 
App. at 392. 
 
10. The district court made no finding as to the credibility of that 
assertion although, as mentioned above, the court was skeptical of other 
police testimony. 
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not knowingly made." D. Ct. Op. at 9. That statement 
suggests that the district court required Tyler to prove that 
the July 20 statement was not made pursuant to a valid 
Miranda waiver, rather than requiring the government to 
establish a valid waiver. The government, however, has the 
burden of establishing that Tyler knowingly, voluntarily and 
intentionally waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
See Brewer, 430 U.S. at 404 ("[I]t [is] incumbent upon the 
State to prove an `intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege.' ") (citing 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). 
 
Here, the district court appears to have reversed that 
burden. If the court did, it committed error. "[C]ourts 
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of 
fundamental constitutional rights."11  
 
2. "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" 
 
In United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532, 540-41 (1947), 
the Supreme Court recognized that: 
 
       After an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by 
       confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is never 
       thereafter free of the psychological and practical 
       disadvantages of having confessed. He can never get 
       the cat back in the bag. The secret is out for good. In 
       such a case, a later confession may always be looked 
       upon as fruit of the first. 
 
The Court has, however, backed away from formulating an 
absolute bar to the use of any subsequent statement. In 
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), the Court elaborated 
upon the circumstances in which the cat may be put back 
into the bag and a subsequent statement admitted despite 
a prior violation of Miranda. The court there recognized that 
the command that all questioning must cease once a 
defendant asserts his or her right to remain silent under 
Miranda cannot be interpreted to preclude all subsequent 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. We emphasize, however, that "[i]f an accused `knowingly and 
intelligently' [communicates with officers without the aid of counsel] we 
see no reason why the uncounseled statements he then makes must be 
excluded at his trial." Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 291 (1988). 
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questioning, nor to bar any subsequent statement 
regardless of circumstances. 
 
Here, the district court held that the July 20 statement 
was purged of any prior taint solely because Miranda 
warnings were given before that statement was taken. D. 
Ct. Op. at 9. However, the fact that Miranda warnings may 
have been given is only part of the analysis. It is necessary, 
though not sufficient, to sustain the government's burden. 
Accordingly, we cannot simply infer from the district court's 
language that it found Tyler's purported waiver on July 20 
to be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. The court did not 
make an inquiry that would be adequate to support such a 
finding. 
 
       Aside from its reliance upon the presence of the 
       Miranda warnings, no specific aspect of the record or of 
       the circumstances was cited by the court in support of 
       its conclusion. The court, in other words, appears to 
       have held that the Miranda warnings in and of 
       themselves broke the causal chain . . . . 
 
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 597 (1975). "If Miranda 
warnings, by themselves, were held to attenuate the taint of 
an unconstitutional arrest, regardless of how wanton and 
purposeful the . . . violation, the effect of the exclusionary 
rule would be substantially diluted." Id. at 601. The same 
is true of an unconstitutionally obtained statement. 12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. In Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 296-97 (1988) the Supreme 
Court stated: 
 
       As a general matter. . . an accused who is admonished with the 
       warnings prescribed by this Court in Miranda . . . has been 
       sufficiently apprised of the nature of his Sixth Amendment rights, 
       and the consequences of abandoning those rights, so that his waiver 
       on this basis will be considered a knowing and intelligent one. 
 
However Patterson did not implicate a violation of the duty to 
scrupulously honor an assertion of the protections afforded by Miranda. 
Accordingly, the Court concluded that once it is established that a 
defendant's decision to not rely on "his rights was uncoerced, that he at 
all times knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he 
was aware of the State's intention to use his statements to secure a 
conviction, the analysis is complete and the waiver is valid as a matter 
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In Campaneria v. Reid, 891 F.2d 1014 (2d Cir. 1989), the 
defendant was approached by police and investigators 
several times while in the hospital recovering from a serious 
knife wound. When police inquired as to whether he was 
finally ready to give a statement, he responded that he was 
not and told them to come back later. They responded by 
insisting "if you want to talk to us, now is the time to do it." 
Id. at 1017. Campaneria's Miranda rights were then read 
and he gave a recorded statement. That statement, was 
admitted at his trial along with others that he gave while 
hospitalized, and he was convicted of manslaughter. 
Campaneria appealed, arguing in part that the failure to 
honor his assertion of his right to remain silent and the 
coercive conditions in which the statements were taken, 
should have precluded the prosecution from admitting the 
recorded statement. The Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit disagreed. The court reasoned that "[t]he purpose of 
this prophylactic rule is to counter the inherently coercive 
effects of custodial interrogations." Id. at 1021. The court 
noted that, nevertheless, it is clear that "[q]uestioning can 
be resumed after fresh Miranda warnings are given and the 
right to remain silent is otherwise scrupulously honored." 
Id. The court then noted several factors that must be 
analyzed to determine whether there is a causal link 
between the prior illegal statements and a subsequent 
statement purportedly obtained pursuant to a valid waiver 
of the right to remain silent and the right to counsel. These 
factors include, but are not limited to, the passage of time, 
the subject matter of the subsequent interrogation, and 
whether the interrogators are "coercive or overbearing." Id. 
at 1019-21. 
 
In Johnson, we discussed the holding in Oregon v. Elstad, 
470 U.S. 298, (1985). We noted that the Court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
of law." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Moran v. Burbine, 
475 U.S. 412, 422-23, 1986). 
 
Here, as we further discuss below, the court's inquiry on remand must 
go beyond whether the defendant gave a knowing, voluntary and 
intelligent waiver on July 20. The court must also consider whether 
obtaining the waiver was consistent with Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 
104. 
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       [i]n Elstad specifically rejected the proposition that the 
       fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, which in the fourth 
       amendment context requires the exclusion of evidence 
       or confessions obtained as a result of a constitutional 
       violation, extends to violations of the Miranda decision. 
       Rather, the Court concluded that Miranda requires 
       only that the circumstances surrounding a subsequent 
       confession be evaluated to determine whether the 
       confession was knowing and voluntary. The Court held 
       further that a suspect's subsequent choice to waive his 
       or her rights after a proper administration of Miranda 
       warnings should ordinarily suffice to dissipate the 
       coercive impact of the earlier confession and to 
       demonstrate knowledge and voluntariness. 
 
816 F.2d at 922-3 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). Here, on remand, the district court mustfirst 
determine if the conduct of the police in obtaining the July 
20 statement was consistent with their duty to 
scrupulously honor Tyler's prior assertion of his right to 
remain silent.13 If the court concludes that duty was not 
breached, it must then consider the totality of 
circumstances surrounding the July 20 statement and 
determine if that statement was the result of a knowing, 
voluntary and intelligent waiver of the protections implicit 
in the Miranda warnings. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 
572-73 (1987). That inquiry must include, but not 
necessarily be limited to, factors such as who initiated the 
July 20 interrogation,14 the time that elapsed between the 
two interrogations, the extent to which the same police 
were involved in both interrogations, the manner in which 
the July 20 interrogation was conducted, and any other 
factor that is relevant to deciding whether police exploited 
their prior disregard of Tyler's right to remain silent in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Obviously, that statement must be suppressed if the Commonwealth 
does not meet its burden of demonstrating that police scrupulously 
honored Tyler's prior assertion of his right to remain silent in taking 
the 
July 20 statement. 
 
14. If police initiated the interrogation, or caused it to be initiated, 
the 
prosecution would be hard-pressed indeed to carry its burden of 
establishing that interrogation was consistent with scrupulously 
honoring Tyler's right to remain silent. 
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obtaining the July 20 statement. Thus, the inquiry must 
include consideration of the extent to which the July 20 
statement was the result of the prior misconduct that 
resulted in the 10:55 pm statement. Although, as we noted 
in Johnson, a valid waiver will "ordinarily suffice to 
dissipate" a prior violation of Miranda, the district court's 
inquiry can not ignore the prior violation in determining if 
the subsequent waiver was valid. See Alston v. Redman, 34 
F.3d 1237, 1253 (3d Cir. 1994) ("In assessing the validity of 
the waiver, we must determine whether it was voluntary, 
i.e. free of coercion or deception, and whether it was 
knowing. Only if the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation reveal both an uncoerced 
choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court 
properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been 
properly waived.") (citations omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 
If the court concludes that the July 20 statement was 
properly admitted, it must then decide if admission of the 
10:55 pm statement was harmless error. 
 
       Absent constitutionally impermissible coercion in 
       eliciting an initial confession, the administration of 
       adequate Miranda warnings before a subsequent 
       voluntary confession validates that confession despite 
       the fact that the earlier confession is inadmissible 
       because the Miranda warnings that preceded it were 
       inadequate 
 
Johnson, 816 F.2d at 922. As noted above, the 10:55 
statement is very similar to the July 20 statement. The 
major difference appears to be that in the 10:55 statement 
Tyler said his brother wanted to kill Proctor, but in the July 
20 statement Tyler said that his brother only wanted to 
scare her. In Johnson we ruled that admission of an oral 
statement taken without proper Miranda warnings was 
harmless error because the defendant gave a subsequent 
written inculpatory statement after Miranda warnings were 
administered. The similarity of the two statements there 
lead us to conclude that "the jury . . . learned no more from 
the improperly admitted confession than it did from the 
properly admitted one." Johnson, 816 F.2d at 923. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). A proper analysis may require a 
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similar conclusion here. On the other hand, the difference 
between the two statements may lead the court to conclude 
that there is sufficient distinction here to conclude that 
admission of the 10:55 statement was not harmless.  
 
In ruling that it is possible that admission of the 10:55 
statement may constitute harmless error if the July 20 
statement was properly admitted we stress two points. 
First, we do not intend to suggest that we think the district 
court should or should not conclude that the error was 
harmless. Second, we do not mean to suggest that the 
Commonwealth may always cure a failure to scrupulously 
honor an accused's assertion of his right to remain silent 
merely by subsequently administering Miranda warnings 
during a defendant-initiated interview. We merely hold that, 
under the circumstances here, that prior police misconduct 
should be considered in determining the validity of the 
subsequent "waiver." 
 
IV. 
 
For the reasons set forth herein, we will reverse the 
district court's order of December 23, 1996 that partially 
denied Tyler's suppression motion, and remand for a 
hearing to determine the validity of the purported Miranda 
waiver that resulted in the July 20 statement. If the court 
concludes that the July 20 statement was properly 
admitted, it will then decide if admission of the 10:55 
statement amounted to harmless error. 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring. 
 
I join parts I, II, and IIIA of the opinion of the court. I 
agree that there is sufficient evidence to support Tyler's 
conviction under 18 U.S.C. S 1512(c)(1)(A)(C) and that the 
statements that Tyler made on July 9, 1992, should have 
been suppressed because the interrogating officers did not 
"scrupulously honor[ ]" Tyler's right under Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), to cut off questioning. 
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975). 
 
I also agree that a remand is necessary with respect to 
Tyler's July 20 statement, but I write separately to explain 
my understanding of the questions to be considered by the 
district court on remand. I find it helpful to discuss 
separately each of the discrete doctrines that are touched 
upon in part IIIB of the majority opinion. 
 
I. 
 
At the outset, I think that it is useful to identify exactly 
which arguments relating to the July 20 statement are 
before us. In his motion to suppress, Tyler said the 
following about the July 20 statement: 
 
       24. On July 20, 1992, eleven days after Mr. Tyler's 
       arrest on murder and related charges, law enforcement 
       officers proceeded to interrogate him at the Adams 
       County Jail without the presence of counsel. 
 
       25. On July 20, 1992, despite the fact that Mr. Tyler 
       had been through the preliminary arraignment and had 
       been sitting in jail for eleven days, law enforcement 
       officers failed to get a written waiver of Mr. Tyler's 
       Miranda rights. 
 
       26. It is submitted herein that Mr. Tyler's 
       statements were coerced and not knowingly, 
       voluntarily, and intelligently made. 
 
       27. These statements were obtained in violation of 
       Mr. Tyler's constitutional rights. U.S. Const. Amend. V 
       and U.S. Const. Amend. VI. 
 
       28. In the alternative, Mr. Tyler would request that 
       This Honorable Court suppress all statements made 
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       after the invocation of his right to remain silent on July 
       9, 1992, as fruits of the poisonous tree. 
 
App. 37-38. 
 
Thus, Tyler seems to have sought suppression of the July 
20 statement on four separate grounds: (1) that th e officers 
failed to obtain a written waiver of his Miranda rights, 
(2) that Tyler did not knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently waive his Fifth Amendment rights to remain 
silent, (3) that he did not knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently waive his Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, 
and (4) that the July 20 statement should have bee n 
suppressed under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine 
based on the improper questioning on July 9. 
 
The district court denied Tyler's motion to suppress the 
July 20 statement and wrote: 
 
       Defendant also seeks to suppress the statement he 
       made to the authorities on July 20, 1992. Essentially, 
       Defendant contends that because the officers failed to 
       obtain a written Miranda waiver, we must suppress the 
       statement. However, Defendant has not cited, and our 
       research has not disclosed, a single case which held 
       that the failure to obtain a written Miranda waiver is 
       grounds for suppression of a defendant's statement 
       where the defendant was verbally informed of his 
       Miranda rights prior to making the statement. 
       Moreover, there is nothing in the record to support an 
       argument that Defendant's waiver was not knowingly 
       made. 
 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 8-9. Accordingly, the court expressly 
rejected Tyler's first argument (that a written Miranda 
waiver was needed), as well as his second and third 
arguments (that he did not knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently waive his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights). 
The court did not expressly address Tyler's fourth argument 
(i.e., that the July 20 statement should have been 
suppressed as the fruit of a poisonous tree.) 
 
The section of Tyler's appellate brief dealing with the July 
20 statement reads as follows: 
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       On July 20, 1992, two of the same troopers who had 
       previously violated Tyler's right to remain silent went to 
       the prison where Tyler had been housed to interrogate 
       him further. Tyler had been in prison for ten days, had 
       been formally charged with criminal homicide and 
       related offenses, and had been arraigned. Tyler's right 
       to an attorney had already attached. In fact, just one 
       day later, on July 21, 1992, an attorney was appointed 
       to represent Tyler. (App. 392). 
 
       The right to counsel "attaches at or after the 
       initiation of adversary judicial proceedings - whether by 
       way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, 
       information, or arraignment." Nelson v. Fulcomer, 911 
       F.2d 928, 941 (3rd Cir. 1990); see also Brewer v. 
       Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232 (1977); Kirby v. 
       Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877 (1972). Presently, 
       "adversarial judicial proceedings" had begun. Therefore, 
       the Troopers violated Tyler's sixth amendment right to 
       counsel and the statement should have been 
       suppressed. 
 
       Moreover, this statement was the product of the 
       initial illegalities that occurred on July 9th and 10th. 
       Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407 
       (1963). As "fruits of the poisonous tree" this statement 
       should be suppressed. 
 
Appellant's Br. at 43-44. Consequently, Tyler's appellate 
brief abandoned the first and second arguments made in 
his suppression motion, i.e. that a written Miranda waiver 
was necessary and that he did not knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily waive his Fifth Amendment rights to remain 
silent. Tyler's brief instead relied entirely on the third and 
fourth arguments made in the district court (i.e. that he did 
not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his Sixth 
Amendment rights to counsel and that the July 20 
statement should have been suppressed under the "fruit of 
the poisonous tree" doctrine). I will now discuss each of 
these arguments separately. 
 
II. 
 
A. I turn first to Tyler's contention that he did not 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his Sixth 
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Amendment right to counsel prior to providing the July 20 
statement. If Tyler was given Miranda warnings and orally 
waived his Miranda rights prior to furnishing this 
statement, then Tyler's argument is governed by Patterson 
v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988). In that case, the defendant, 
after indictment, waived his Miranda rights and then 
provided an incriminating statement without counsel 
present. The defendant argued that he had not made a 
"knowing and intelligent" waiver of his Sixth Amendment 
rights (id. at 292), but the Supreme Court disagreed. The 
Court identified the "key inquiry" as follows: "Was the 
accused, who waived his Sixth Amendment rights during 
postindictment questioning, made sufficiently aware of his 
right to have counsel present during the questioning, and 
of the possible consequences of a decision to forgo the aid 
of counsel?" Id. at 292-93. The Court noted that "the 
Miranda warnings given [the defendant] made him aware of 
his right to have counsel present during the questioning." 
Id. at 293. The Court further noted that "the Miranda 
warnings also served to make [the defendant] aware of the 
consequences of a decision by him to waive his Sixth 
Amendment rights during postindictment questioning." Id. 
The Court then concluded that "[a]s a general matter . . . 
an accused who is admonished with the warnings 
prescribed by this Court in Miranda . . . has been 
sufficiently apprised of the nature of his Sixth Amendment 
rights, and of the consequences of abandoning those rights, 
so that his waiver on this basis will be considered a 
knowing and intelligent one." Id. at 296 (emphasis added) 
(footnote omitted). In a footnote, the Court pointed out that 
"[t]his does not mean, of course, that all Sixth Amendment 
challenges to the conduct of postindictment questioning will 
fail whenever the challenged practice would pass 
constitutional muster under Miranda." Id. at 296 n.9. The 
Court then referred to a situation in which "a suspect was 
not told that his lawyer was trying to reach him during 
questioning" and a situation in which an undercover police 
officer initiated a surreptitious conversation with an 
unindicted suspect. Id. 
 
In light of Patterson, the first question that the district 
court should address on remand is whether Tyler was given 
Miranda warnings and waived his Miranda rights. Trooper 
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Fenstermacher and Trooper Graham testified that Tyler was 
given Miranda warnings and orally waived his rights. See 
App. 255, 298. No contrary evidence in the record has been 
called to our attention, and indeed Tyler's briefs do not 
assert either that Miranda warnings were not administered 
or that Tyler did not orally waive his Miranda rights. 
Nevertheless, since the district court questioned the 
accuracy of other parts of the officers' testimony, I agree 
that we should remand for the district court to make an 
explicit finding on this point. If the district court finds on 
the basis of the record of the suppression hearing that Tyler 
waived his Miranda rights, the court should then consider 
whether there are any unusual circumstances present that 
are comparable to those mentioned by the Supreme Court 
in footnote 9 of Patterson. 
 
B. If the district court finds, on the other hand, that 
Tyler did not waive his Miranda rights, then Tyler's Sixth 
Amendment argument should be analyzed under Brewer v. 
Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), and related cases. Under 
these precedents, the test is whether all of the relevant 
circumstances show "an intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege.' " Id. at 404 
(quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
 
III. 
 
The other argument that is properly before us is whether 
the July 20 statement must be suppressed under the "fruit 
of the poisonous tree" doctrine, which developed in Fourth 
Amendment cases. See e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471, 484-88 (1963) (suppressing statements and 
tangible evidence resulting from an unconstitutional arrest). 
The Supreme Court addressed this question in Oregon v. 
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985). In that case, the defendant 
was arrested and made an incriminating statement without 
having been given Miranda warnings. He was later given 
such warnings, waived his Miranda rights, and executed a 
written confession. Relying on the "fruit of the poisonous 
tree" doctrine, the state appellate court held that the 
written confession had to be suppressed. The state court 
reasoned that, even though the written confession did not 
result from "actual compulsion," "the coercive impact of the 
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unconstitutionally obtained statement remains, because in 
a defendant's mind it has sealed his fate." Oregon v. Elstad, 
658 P.2d 552, 554 (1983). The state court wrote that, 
because of the brief period separating the two incidents, 
"[t]he cat was sufficiently out of the bag to exert a coercive 
impact on [the] defendant's later admissions." Id. at 555. 
 
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine does not apply 
when the "poisonous tree" consists of a violation of the 
prophylactic Miranda rule. The Court noted that if an initial 
confession is actually coerced, in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment itself, "the time that passes between 
confessions, the change in place of interrogations, and the 
change in identity of the interrogators all bear on whether 
that coercion has carried over into the second confession." 
470 U.S. at 310. But when an initial confession must be 
suppressed simply because it is obtained in violation of 
Miranda, "[a] subsequent administration of Miranda 
warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but 
unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the 
conditions that precluded admission of the earlier 
statement." Id. at 314. 
 
Our court applied the teaching of Elstad in United States 
v. Johnson, 816 F.2d 918, 922-23 (3d Cir. 1987). We wrote: 
"Absent constitutionally impermissible coercion in eliciting 
an initial confession, the administration of adequate 
Miranda warnings before a subsequent voluntary 
confession validates that confession despite the fact that 
the earlier confession is inadmissible because the Miranda 
warnings that preceded it were inadequate." Id. at 922. On 
that basis, we affirmed the conviction of the defendant, who 
had provided an initial oral confession that he claimed was 
obtained in violation of Miranda, as well as a subsequent 
written confession furnished after adequate Miranda 
warnings and a waiver. We held that even if the first, oral 
confession had to be suppressed under Miranda, the 
second, written confession was nevertheless admissible, 
and that any error in admitting the oral statement at trial 
was harmless. Id. at 922-23. 
 
In view of Elstad and Johnson, it is apparent that the 
defendant's invocation of the Fourth Amendment "fruit of 
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the poisonous tree" doctrine is inapposite, and I am fearful 
that confusion may result from the majority's reference to 
"fruit of the poisonous tree" precedents such as Brown v. 
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975). See Maj. Op. at 12-13. The 
majority quotes Brown's statement to the effect that 
Miranda warnings by themselves may not be sufficient to 
"attenuate the taint of an unconstitutional arrest.' " Maj. 
Op. at 13 (quoting Brown 422 U.S. at 602). And the 
majority observes that "[t]he same is true of an 
unconstitutionally obtained statement." Maj. Op. at 13. 
However, while it is true, as Elstad itself pointed out (see 
470 U.S. at 310), that the taint of an unconstitutionally 
obtained statement may not always be attenuated by 
Miranda warnings, this rule is inapplicable when the initial 
illegality consists of a violation of the Miranda prophylactic 
rule. 
 
It is true that the type of Miranda violation in Elstad 
(questioning a suspect in custody without first providing 
Miranda warnings) is somewhat different from the type of 
Miranda violation that occurred here on July 9 (failing 
scrupulously to honor Tyler's invocation of his right to 
remain silent by obtaining a Miranda waiver and 
questioning him shortly after he initially invoked that right). 
But I see no basis for concluding that Elstad  is not equally 
applicable in this context. The violation that we have held 
occurred on July 9 was a type of Miranda violation, not a 
violation of any of Tyler's constitutional rights. Indeed, 
Tyler's brief did not seek suppression of the July 9 
statement on constitutional grounds. See Appellant's Br. at 
37-43. 
 
Applying Elstad and Johnson, the question to be 
addressed by the district court on remand is whether the 
July 20 statement was preceded by a valid Miranda waiver. 
If it was, then the Miranda violation on July 9 provides no 
ground for suppressing the July 20 statement. 
 
IV. 
 
Although Tyler has not presented this argument in so 
many words, the majority seems to interpret his 
submissions as raising an additional argument that it is 
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related to, but conceptually distinct from the argument just 
discussed. This additional argument is that the July 20 
statement must be suppressed under Michigan v. Mosley 
because, in questioning Tyler on July 20 after he had 
previously invoked his Miranda rights on July 9, the 
troopers did not "scrupulously honor[ ]" his Miranda rights. 
See Maj. Op. at 14-16 & n.11. This argument is 
conceptually distinct from the Elstad argument addressed 
above because it is not dependent on the existence of a 
Miranda violation -- or any other type of violation -- on 
July 9: even if the police scrupulously follow Miranda in the 
initial questioning of a suspect, a Michigan v. Mosley 
violation may ensue if the defendant invokes his right to 
remain silent and the police seek to question him shortly 
thereafter. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 102 ("To 
permit the continuation of custodial interrogation after a 
momentary cessation would clearly frustrate the purposes 
of Miranda by allowing repeated rounds of questioning to 
undermine the will of the person being questioned."). 
 
In addressing this Michigan v. Mosley issue on remand, 
the first question that the district court should address is 
whether Tyler or the troopers initiated the July 20 
interview. Trooper Fenstermacher testified that it was his 
recollection that he and Trooper Graham went to the prison 
and spoke to Tyler because they received word from a 
prison guard that Tyler wanted to talk with them. App. 298, 
321. Tyler contends that Fenstermacher's testimony was 
"questionable at best" (Appellant's Reply Br. at 12), but no 
contrary evidence in the record has been called to our 
attention. Whether Fenstermacher's testimony is to be 
believed is a question of fact that the district court should 
resolve on remand based on the record of the suppression 
hearing and the court's assessment of Fenstermacher's 
credibility. 
 
If the district court finds that Tyler initiated the July 20 
interview, Michigan v. Mosley does not provide a basis for 
suppressing any statements that Tyler made on that day. 
On the other hand, if the district court finds that the 
troopers initiated the July 20 interview, the admissibility of 
the July 20 statement will turn on an application of the 
standard set out in Michigan v. Mosley and the subsequent 
related cases. 
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V. 
 
If the district court concludes that the July 20 statement 
was admissible, then the district court must decide in the 
first instance whether the admission of the July 9 
statement was harmless error. The two statements are 
substantively very similar, and while the earlier statement 
incriminated Tyler's brother David to a somewhat greater 
degree than did the later statement, see Maj. Op. at 16, 
Tyler has not yet explained why the earlier statement was 
any more incriminating to him. Nevertheless, I agree with 
my colleagues that it is best that we not resolve this 
question at this time. Until the district court has made the 
findings necessary to decide whether the July 20 statement 
is itself admissible, we cannot be sure whether the 
harmless error issue will ever be reached. In addition, the 
trial court, which presumably has greater familiarity with 
the entire record of this case, has yet to make an initial 
ruling on the harmless error question, and it may be that 
further briefing and argumentation by counsel on this 
question at the district court level may provide additional 
illumination. Accordingly, I agree with my colleagues that 
we should remand this case to the district court for the 
findings and other determinations that I have mentioned 
and, if necessary, for a decision by the district court in the 
first instance as to whether the erroneous admission of the 
July 20 statement was harmless. 
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